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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
The University of Pennsylvania ("the University") appeals 
from an order of the District Court denying its motion for 
summary judgment. The University premised its summary 
judgment motion on a claimed immunity from liability 
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 
127 (1961). Before reaching the merits of the District 
Court's decision, we must determine whether a denial of a 
summary judgment motion that is predicated on Noerr- 
Pennington immunity constitutes a final, collateral order 
appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Because we conclude 
that such an order is not appealable under the narrow 
collateral order doctrine, we will dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
The appellee, We, Inc., is the owner and operator of two 
adjacent establishments, a coin laundry and a pinball 
arcade, located near the appellant University of 
Pennsylvania's dental school in West Philadelphia. This suit 
 
                                2 
  
arises out of a Cease Operations Order that was issued to 
appellee by the City of Philadelphia after the University 
lodged numerous complaints with the City. The University 
alleges that, prior to the Order's issuance, appellee's 
businesses were a nuisance and a threat to public safety 
because they were the locus of a variety of disorderly and 
unlawful activities, including assaults, batteries, and 
curfew and truancy violations. Pursuant to this concern, 
the University repeatedly contacted the City of Philadelphia 
and urged action by the City to address what it perceived 
to be unlawful activity associated with the businesses. The 
University met with City representatives regarding its 
concern on several occasions and provided data gathered 
by the University Police to support its allegations. 
 
Without first providing notice or an opportunity for a 
hearing, the City issued a Cease Operations order to the 
businesses and posted it on the premises in the presence of 
University police officers. Following the order's posting, We, 
Inc., filed suit against the City and the University under 42 
U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1985, alleging a deprivation of its 
property without due process. The City of Philadelphia 
settled the claims against them and the University moved 
for summary judgment, claiming immunity for at least 
some of its actions under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
The District Court denied the University's motion after 
finding that, by participating in the posting and execution 
of the Cease Operations Order, the University defendants' 
conduct arguably went beyond the mere "petitioning" of 
government that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is designed 
to protect. The University now appeals the District Court's 
denial of summary judgment. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
Under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, appeals as of right are limited to 
"final decisions of the district courts." 1 The denial of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 28 U.S.C. S 1291 provides: "The courts of appeals ... shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of 
the 
United States...." 
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motion for summary judgment ordinarily is not afinal order 
and, accordingly, is not normally appealable. Sacred Heart 
Medical Center v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 537, 543 (3d Cir. 
1992). Under the "collateral order" doctrine, however, a 
decision of a district court may be appealable as a"final 
decision" under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 if it (1)"conclusively 
determine[s]" the disputed question; (2)"resolve[s] an 
important issue completely separate" from the merits of the 
action; and (3) is "effectively unreviewable" on appeal from 
a final judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 
463, 468-69 (1978). If the order at issue fails to satisfy any 
one of these requirements, it is not an appealable collateral 
order. See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 
485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988); Christy v. Horn 115 F.3d 201, 
204 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Since Coopers & Lybrand, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly referred to the collateral order doctrine as 
"narrow," described the conditions for its applications as 
"stringent" and urged that it "should stay that way and 
never be allowed to swallow the general rule." See e.g., 
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 
868 (1994); Midland Asphalt Corp., v. United States, 489 
U.S. 794, 799 (1989). We have followed this admonition 
and consistently construed the collateral order exception 
narrowly "lest the exception swallow up the salutary 
general rule that only final orders be appealed." Yakowicz 
v. Pennsylvania, 683 F.2d 778, 783 n.10 (3d Cir. 1982); see 
also Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51 
(3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, strict construction of the 
collateral order doctrine is consistent with the longstanding 
congressional policy against piecemeal appeals that 
underlies the final judgment rule. See Lusardi v. Xerox 
Corp., 747 F.2d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
To guard against the temptation to expand the doctrine's 
reach, the Supreme Court has instructed that "the issue of 
appealability under S 1291 is to be determined for the 
entire category to which a claim belongs." Desktop Direct 
Inc., 511 U.S. at 868; Christy, 115 F.3d at 204. This 
approach reflects the Court's insistence that thefinality 
requirement of S 1291 must not be reduced to a case-by- 
case determination, see Richardson-Merrill Inc. v. Koller, 
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472 U.S. 424, 439 (1985), and that courts consider 
appealability "without regard to the chance that the 
litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular 
injustice averted, by a prompt appellate court decision." 
Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. at 868 (citation omitted). Thus, in 
this case, we consider whether an order denying a claim of 
immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is an 
immediately appealable collateral order. 
 
B. 
 
The University contends that the denial of its claim of 
immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 
It likens Noerr-Pennington immunity to the absolute and 
qualified immunity enjoyed by public officials, the denial of 
which is immediately appealable under that doctrine. See 
Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982). It is true, as the 
University stresses, that a denial of a motion for summary 
judgment based on Noerr-Pennington immunity, like the 
denial of a summary judgment based on official immunity, 
ordinarily will conclusively determine an important issue 
unrelated to the merits of the case. We therefore focus our 
attention on the third requirement of the collateral order 
doctrine -- that the District Court's decision be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment. 
 
In holding that an order denying qualified immunity to a 
public official is "effectively unreviewable on appeal from 
final judgment," the Supreme Court reasoned in Mitchell v. 
Forsythe that an "essential attribute" of qualified immunity 
is "an entitlement not to stand trial under certain 
circumstances," and thus qualified immunity entails "an 
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." 
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 530 (emphasis in original). As 
with absolute immunity, this entitlement "is effectively lost 
if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Id. at 526. 
Since Mitchell, denials of a state's Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suit in a federal court similarly have been 
held to be immediately appealable. See Puerto Rico 
Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 
139, 146 (1993) ("the very object and purpose of the 11th 
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Amendment [are] to prevent the indignity of subjecting a 
State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the 
instance of private parties") (citation omitted). 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly urged courts to 
employ caution and restraint, however, in reviewing claims 
of a right not to stand trial. Not all defenses that warrant 
a pretrial dismissal entail a right not to stand trial. As the 
Supreme Court has explained, there is "a crucial distinction 
between a right not to be tried and a right whose remedy 
requires the dismissal of charges." United States v. 
Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 269 (1982). In Van 
Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1988), the 
Court noted that "[b]ecause of the important interests 
furthered by the final-judgment rule and the ease with 
which certain pretrial claims for dismissal may be alleged to 
entail the right not to stand trial, we should examine the 
nature of the right asserted with special care to determine 
whether an essential aspect of the claim is the right to be 
free of the burdens of a trial." 
 
In Desktop Direct, the Court was even more emphatic in 
insisting that efforts to obviate S 1291's final judgment rule 
by claiming an immunity from suit should be critically 
assessed. "We have, after all, acknowledged that virtually 
every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial 
dismissal might loosely be described as conferring a"right 
not to stand trial. . . . Thus, precisely because candor 
forces us to acknowledge that there is no single, `obviously 
correct way to characterize' an asserted right, we have held 
that S 1291 requires courts of appeals to view claims of a 
`right not to be tried' with skepticism, if not a jaundiced 
eye." Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. at 873. 
 
Thus, as the Supreme Court has framed it, "[t]he critical 
question, following Mitchell, is whether `the essence' of the 
claimed right is a right not to stand trial." Van 
Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 524. This Court has not yet 
addressed this critical question in the context of a claim to 
Noerr-Pennington immunity. We now proceed to do so, 
based on the nature and extent of protection afforded by 
Noerr-Pennington immunity and the Supreme Court's 
general admonition that claims to immunity from suit be 
critically assessed. Because we conclude that the Noerr- 
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Pennington doctrine does not provide an "immunity from 
suit" but rather only a defense against liability, we hold 
that a denial of a summary judgment motion predicated on 
Noerr-Pennington "immunity" is not effectively unreviewable 
on appeal from a final judgment. 
 
III. 
 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine originated in the anti-trust 
context as the proposition that "joint efforts to influence 
public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though 
intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not 
illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme 
itself violative of the Sherman Act." See United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); Eastern 
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127 (1961). The Supreme Court has predicated this 
antitrust "immunity" on two principles: first, the First 
Amendment right of citizens to petition the government and 
participate in the legitimate processes of government, and 
second, a statutory interpretation of the Sherman Act 
under which Congress is viewed as not intending the Act to 
reach the political process. As Noerr explained, "[t]o hold 
that the government retains the power to act in this 
representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that 
the people cannot freely inform the government of their 
wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to 
regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a 
purpose which would have no basis whatever in the 
legislative history of that Act. Secondly, and of at least 
equal significance, such a construction of the Sherman Act 
would raise important constitutional questions. The right of 
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of 
Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to 
Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." Noerr, 365 
U.S. at 137-38 (footnote omitted); see also City of Columbia 
v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) 
("The [Noerr-Pennington] doctrine .. . rests ultimately upon 
a recognition that the antitrust laws, `tailored as they are 
for the business world, are not at all appropriate for 
application in the political arena.' ") (quoting Noerr, 365 
U.S. at 141). 
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This court, along with other courts, has by analogy 
extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to offer protection to 
citizens' petitioning activities in contexts outside the anti- 
trust area as well. For example, in Brownsville Golden Age 
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1988), 
we found that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protected 
individuals from tort liability for their actions in petitioning 
the government to shut down a nursing home that was 
operating in violation of applicable regulations. Citing to the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine in Brownsville, we affirmed an 
order granting summary judgment for the defendants, 
noting that: 
 
       "The rule that liability cannot be imposed for damage 
       caused by inducing legislative, administrative, or 
       judicial action is applicable here. The conduct on 
       which this suit is based is protected by the firmly 
       rooted principle, endemic to a democratic government, 
       that enactment of and adherence to law is the 
       responsibility of all. The problem is not too much 
       citizen involvement but too little. Thus, we hold that as 
       a matter of law, defendants' actions in calling 
       Brownsville's violations to the attention of state and 
       federal authorities and eliciting public interest cannot 
       serve as the basis of tort liability." 
 
Id. at 160. 
 
Thus, the purpose of Noerr-Pennington as applied in areas 
outside the antitrust field is the protection of the right to 
petition. Immunity from liability is necessary so as not to 
chill the exercise of that right. The question presented by 
this case is whether immunity from the burden of suit is 
also necessary to avoid an unconstitutional chill of the right 
to petition. 
 
It is helpful at the outset to note that the Petition Clause 
of the First Amendment neither enjoys "special First 
Amendment status" nor confers an "absolute immunity" for 
privilege. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1985). 
As the Court held in McDonald, the Petition Clause is on a 
par with the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble. It 
follows that the protection afforded by Noerr-Pennington is 
no more absolute or extensive than that provided by other 
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First Amendment guarantees. We find this helpful because 
relevant jurisprudence concerning burdens of the right to 
freedom of speech is more fully developed than that 
concerning the right to petition. 
 
Citizens who exercise their First Amendment rights of 
free speech and free press enjoy significant protection from 
defamation liability in order to prevent undue chill on the 
exercise of those rights. See, e.g., New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (liability to public officials); 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (liability 
to public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974) (liability to private individuals). The courts have 
never recognized, however, that an immunity from suit was 
necessary to prevent an unacceptable chill of those First 
Amendment rights. Indeed, the law appears to be to the 
contrary. 
 
In Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), respondent 
actress Shirley Jones claimed that she had been libeled in 
an article written by petitioners in Florida and published in 
a national magazine with a large circulation in California 
where she resided. Petitioners were served in Florida with 
process issued by a California court, and the issue was 
whether that court could exercise personal jurisdiction over 
petitioners. Although the intermediate appellate court in 
California concluded that petitioners' contacts with 
California would ordinarily be sufficient, it held that 
jurisdiction could not be exercised "because of the potential 
`chilling effect' on reporters and editors which would result 
from requiring them to appear in remote jurisdictions to 
answer for the content of articles upon which they worked." 
Id. at 786. 
 
The Supreme Court disagreed. While in no way 
disparaging petitioners' First Amendment rights, the Court 
found that the burden of litigating in a distant forum was 
insufficient to constitute an unacceptable chill of the 
journalists' exercise of such rights. As Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous court, put it: 
 
       . . . [t]he potential chill on protected First Amendment 
       activity stemming from libel and defamation actions is 
       already taken into account in the constitutional 
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       limitations in the substantive law governing such suits. 
       See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
       (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
       (1974). To reintroduce those concerns at the 
       jurisdictional stage would be a form of double 
       counting. We have already declined in other contexts to 
       grant special procedural protections to defendants in 
       libel and defamation actions in addition to the 
       constitutional protections embodied in the substantive 
       laws. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) 
       (no First Amendment privilege bars inquiry into 
       editorial process). See also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 
       U.S. 111, 120, n.9 (1979) (implying that no special 
       rules apply for summary judgment). 
 
Id. at 790-91. If safeguarding the First Amendment rights 
asserted in Calder did not also require protecting against 
the burden of litigating in a distant forum, it is unlikely the 
Supreme Court will find that the First Amendment 
protection Noerr-Pennington provides against liability for 
petitioning also includes an across-the-board immunity 
from suit. 
 
This court as well has rejected the notion that the burden 
of litigation poses an unacceptable threat to First 
Amendment values. At one point, the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth 
and D.C. Courts of Appeals took the position that summary 
judgment should enjoy a special status in defamation cases 
because "[t]he threat of being put to the defense of a 
lawsuit . . . may be as chilling to the exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit 
itself." Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 
(D.C. Cir. 1966); see Anderson v. Cramlet, 789 F.2d 840, 
843 (10th Cir. 1986) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court 
"express[ed] some doubt" about such an approach in 
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979), 
however, and this court flatly rejected it in Lavin v. New 
York News, Inc., 757 F.2d 1416, 1419 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(footnote omitted): 
 
       In this case, the bench opinion of the district judge can 
       reasonably be interpreted as expressing the view that, 
       because of First Amendment concerns, summary 
       judgment is more easily obtainable by a media 
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       defendant in a defamation case than by defendants in 
       other cases. We reject that approach. A substantial 
       dispute of material fact does not disappear merely 
       because a media defendant is being sued, or because 
       a public official is the plaintiff; and plaintiff 's right to 
       a jury trial is entitled to no less respect. 
 
Accord Clark v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc. , 684 F.2d 
1208, 1212 (6th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the argument that 
different considerations apply to summary judgment 
motions in the defamation context); Yiamouyiannis v. 
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932, 939- 
40 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Anderson, 789 F.2d at 842-43 
(declining to apply a preference either for or against 
summary judgment in defamation cases). 
 
If, as McDonald requires, the right to petition enjoys no 
special status among First Amendment rights, these 
authorities suggest that Noerr-Pennington immunity 
provides only a defense to liability, not an immunity from 
suit. Under the collateral order doctrine, therefore, the 
denial of a motion for summary judgment predicated on 
Noerr-Pennington is not a collateral order subject to 
immediate review. The only other court of appeals to have 
considered this issue reached a similar conclusion. In Segni 
v. Commercial Office of Spain, 816 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1987), 
the defendants moved to dismiss a civil rights complaint on 
the ground that "their conduct enjoy[ed] an `absolute 
immunity' by virtue of the guarantee in the First 
Amendment of the right to petition government for redress." 
Id. at 345. The District Court denied the motion and the 
defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals acknowledged 
that "[w]here the right asserted by way of defense to a 
lawsuit is (or includes) a right not to bear the burden of 
suit itself, regardless of outcome, the denial of that right, as 
by denying a motion to dismiss the suit, is appealable 
immediately by virtue of the collateral order doctrine." Id. at 
345. It nevertheless dismissed the appeal for want of 
jurisdiction, observing: 
 
       It's quite a leap, though, to say that anytime a motion 
       to dismiss on First Amendment grounds is denied, the 
       defendant can appeal the denial, on the theory that the 
       failure to dismiss the suit at the earliest opportunity is 
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       itself an infringement of the defendant's First 
       Amendment rights. 
 
Id. 
 
The Segni court distinguished Noerr-Pennington immunity 
from "state action" doctrine under Parker v. Brown, 317 
U.S. 341 (1943), on the ground that the latter doctrine "had 
been interpreted to create an immunity from suit and not 
just from judgment -- to spare state officials the burdens 
and uncertainties of the litigation itself as well as the cost 
of an adverse judgment." Id. at 346. The possibility that the 
"burdens of suit . . . might deter [public officials] from 
vigorous execution of their office [was] a consideration 
missing in the case of the private defendant." Id. 
 
We agree with the conclusion reached by the Segni court 
and with its explanation of the distinction between cases 
involving immunity for a public official and those involving 
immunity for a private defendant. Moreover, we have been 
unable to find any case holding that the burden of litigation 
on a private defendant justifies an immunity from suit as 
well as a defense to liability. 
 
In re: Asbestos School Litigation, 46 F.3d 1284 (3d Cir. 
1994), a case heavily relied upon by the University, seems 
to us to support our conclusion. In that case, we 
considered a request for a writ of mandamus that would 
require the District Court to dismiss the claim against the 
petitioner, Pfizer, Inc. The underlying suit was a nationwide 
class action by 30,000 school districts against Pfizer and 
other former manufacturers of asbestos-containing building 
products. The plaintiffs claimed that Pfizer, by associating 
with a trade association, Safe Building Alliance ("SBA"), had 
joined an ongoing civil conspiracy and had thus become 
liable for all of the other defendants' prior tortious conduct. 
After the District Court denied Pfizer's motion for summary 
judgment, Pfizer petitioned this court, contending that the 
burden of further litigation in the District Court would chill 
its exercise of its First Amendment right of association. 
 
We first held that Pfizer had a "clear and indisputable" 
right to the issuance of the writ because the District Court's 
decision was "squarely inconsistent" with the Supreme 
Court's holding in Claiborne Hardware that conspiracy 
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liability cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be 
imposed based upon mere association. Id. at 1289; NAACP 
v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 918-20 (1982). We 
then turned to the question of whether Pfizer had other 
adequate means to attain the desired relief, such as by 
waiting to appeal from the final judgment. We did not, as 
the University suggests, establish a rule that anyone with 
First Amendment protection from liability was entitled to an 
immediate appeal from the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment based on that protection. To the contrary, we 
issued the writ only after making a specific finding that 
waiting for an appeal from a final judgment would cause 
Pfizer irreparable injury throughout the remainder of 
extensive proceedings before the trial court. We found that 
"[w]hile the district court's ruling did not directly prohibit 
Pfizer from associating with the SBA during the remainder 
of the district court proceedings, there [could] be little 
question that in reality the district court ruling[would] 
powerfully inhibit Pfizer from doing so." In re: Asbestos, 46 
F.3d at 1295. Pfizer had a need "to engage, by means of the 
SBA, in a `public dialogue on the important issue of safety 
of in-place asbestos containing building products,' and 
Pfizer would suffer irreparable harm if it were deprived of 
the opportunity to engage in such constitutionally protected 
activity." Id. at 1294-95 (footnote omitted). The fact that we 
found it necessary to find a specific and continuing chill on 
Pfizer supports the conclusion that the generalized chill of 
anticipated litigation on others who wish to petition is, 
alone, insufficient to overcome the strong policy against 
piecemeal appeals. Unlike Pfizer, the University has pointed 
to no specific continuing chill on anticipated petitioning, 
but rather only to the burden of defending the remainder of 
this litigation.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This court's decision in San Fillipo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3d 
Cir. 1994), is also consistent with the result that we reach. In San 
Fillipo, this court held that a government employee is protected against 
retaliation under the Petition Clause for havingfiled suit against his 
employer on a matter of purely private concern. Although the employee 
would have had no First Amendment immunity against employer 
discipline if his expressive conduct had constituted speech, Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983), the court held that Connick's "public 
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In sum, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides immunity 
from liability for certain types of constitutionally protected 
activity. While of course "there is value -- to all but the 
most unusual litigant -- in triumphing before trial," Van 
Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 524, the interest protected by 
Noerr-Pennington can be fully vindicated after trial. Without 
diminishing the importance of the First Amendment right to 
petition that is protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
we hold that a right not to be burdened with a trial is 
simply not an aspect of this protection. 
 
Because we conclude that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
does not confer a right not to stand trial, but rather 
provides only a defense against liability for certain conduct, 
we find that an order denying Noerr-Pennington immunity is 
effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, and 
thus is not an appealable collateral order. 
 
IV. 
 
We will dismiss the defendant's appeal from the district 
court's order denying summary judgment for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
concern" limit on the right of free speech did not apply to the plaintiff 
's 
exercise of his right to petition in this context. Id. at 443. The 
justification behind the "public concern" limitation on the Free Speech 
Clause protection of public employees was found inapplicable in the 
context of disciplinary action taken in retaliation for the employee's 
availing himself of a mechanism formally adopted by his government 
employer for the redress of grievances against the employer. Although 
the San Fillipo court found that the Petition Clause provided broader 
protection than the right of free speech, both its holding and its 
reasoning were explicitly confined to the public employment/retaliatory 
discharge context. See id. at 438 ("the scope of the petition right 
depends 
upon the context in which the right is exercised"); id. at 438 n.17 
(rejecting as inapposite various cases arising outside the public 
employment/retaliatory discharge context); id.  at 441-42 (finding that 
the government's adoption of a formal redress process provides an 
"independent reason" for essentially "affording special treatment to 
speech found in a grievance" or similar petition). Thus, nothing in San 
Fillipo contravenes our conclusion that, like other First Amendment 
rights, the right to petition protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity 
conveys an immunity from liability, but not from suit. 
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